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Abstract The 1985 paper by Carlos Alchourrón (1931–1996), Peter Gärdenfors,
and David Makinson (AGM), “On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet
Contraction and Revision Functions” was the starting-point of a large and
rapidly growing literature that employs formal models in the investigation
of changes in belief states and databases. In this review, the first twenty-
five years of this development are summarized. The topics covered include
equivalent characterizations of AGM operations, extended representations of
the belief states, change operators not included in the original framework,
iterated change, applications of the model, its connections with other formal
frameworks, computatibility of AGM operations, and criticism of the model.
Keywords Belief change · Belief revision · Theory change ·
Partial meet contraction · Partial meet revision · AGM ·
Carlos Alchourrón · Peter Gärdenfors · David Makinson
1 Introduction
Many research papers have been called “seminal”, but few deserve that
designation as much as the article in the Journal of Symbolic Logic in 1985
by Carlos Alchourrón (1931–1996), Peter Gärdenfors, and David Makinson,
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“On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision
Functions”. The immediate prehistory of this article has been told previously
by Makinson [189], and now also by Gärdenfors [112]. Like all major scientific
achievements, that of the AGM trio was much facilitated by previous work
by others. Computer scientists such as Doyle [65] and Fagin et al. [72] had
developed precise models of database updating, and philosophers such as
Harper [146] and in particular Levi [170, 171] had investigated philosophical
issues in belief change.
The yearly number of Web of Science citations of the AGM article has
increased from about 15 per in the 1990’s to about 50 in the most recent
years—a remarkable record for a logic paper. Its impact has been profound
both among philosophers and in the artificial intelligence community [48].
It is the purpose of this review to exemplify the diversity and significance of
the research that has been inspired by the AGM article. Section 2 covers some
of the equivalent characterizations of the AGM model that have contributed
to our understanding of it. In Section 3 we discuss some of the more common
criticisms of AGM. Section 4 is devoted to extensions and variations of the
belief state representation in AGM (belief sets), Section 5 to iterated change,
and Section 6 to operations of change that have been introduced in addition to
the three AGM operations (contraction, revision, and expansion). Section 7
provides an overview of applications and connections with other areas of
research, and Section 8 summarizes some results on the computability of belief
change operations.
2 Equivalent Characterizations
The AGM model has been expressed in several seemingly dissimilar ways.
2.1 AGM Briefly Summarized
In the basic AGM framework a person’s belief state is represented by a set
K of sentences that is closed under the operation Cn of logical consequence,
i.e. K = Cn(K). In order to contract K by a sentence p we consider the set
K ⊥ p of all maximal subsets of K not implying p. A selection function γ
selects the most plausible elements of K ⊥ p. Whenever K ⊥ p is non-empty,
γ (K ⊥ p) is a non-empty subset of K ⊥ p. The partial meet contraction ∼γ
based on γ is defined as K ∼γ p = ⋂ γ (K ⊥ p). In the limiting case when
p is a tautology, K ∼γ p = K. If γ (K ⊥ p) = K ⊥ p for all p, then ∼γ is
the full meet contraction, also denoted ∼. If γ (K ⊥ p) is always a singleton
when K ⊥ p is non-empty, then ∼γ is a maxichoice contraction. If there is a
transitive relation  such that γ (K ⊥ p) = {X ∈ K ⊥ p | (∀Y ∈ K ⊥ p)(Y 
X)} for all nonempty K ⊥ p, then ∼γ is transitively relational. There are two
operations that add beliefs to a belief set: K + p = Cn(K ∪ {p}) (expansion)
and K ∗γ p = Cn((K ∼γ ¬p) ∪ {p}) (revision). In the AGM article, axiomatic
characterizations were provided for all these operations. These axioms are
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Table 1 The standard AGM postulates
Basic contraction postulates Basic revision postulates
K ÷ p = Cn(K ÷ p) (closure) K ∗ p = Cn(K ∗ p) (closure)
K ÷ p ⊆ K (inclusion) K ∗ p ⊆ K + p (inclusion)
If K  p then K ÷ p = K (vacuity) If K  ¬p then K + p ⊆ K ∗ p (vacuity)
If  p then p /∈ K ÷ p (success) p ∈ K ∗ p (success)
If 
 p ↔ q then K ÷ p = K ÷ q If 
 p ↔ q then K ∗ p = K ∗ q
(extensionality) (extensionality)
K ⊆ (K ÷ p) + p (recovery) If p  ⊥ then K ∗ p  ⊥ (consistency)
Supplementary contraction postulates Supplementary revision postulates
(K ÷ p) ∩ (K ÷ q) ⊆ K ÷ (p&q) K ∗ (p&q) ⊆ (K ∗ p) + q
(conjunctive overlap) (superexpansion)
If p /∈ K ÷ (p&q) then K ÷ (p&q) ⊆ K ÷ p If K ∗ p  ¬q then (K ∗ p) + q ⊆ K ∗ (p&q)
(conjunctive inclusion) (subexpansion)
The six basic contraction postulates exactly characterize partial meet contraction, and all eight con-
traction postulates exactly characterize transitively relational partial meet contraction. Similarly,
the six basic revision postulates exactly characterize partial meet revision, and all eight revision
postulates exactly characterize transitively relational partial meet revision. X 
 p is an alternative
notation for p ∈ Cn(X) and 
 p for p ∈ Cn(∅)
listed in Table 1. Subsequently, several other equivalent characterizations have
been developed.
2.2 Safe and Kernel Contraction
Alchourrón and Makinson proposed the operation of safe contraction that is
based on a non-circular relation < on the elements of K. An element a of K is
safe with respect to p if and only if all inclusion-minimal p-implying subsets
of K either do not contain a or contain some b such that b < a. The safe
contraction ÷ based on < yields as outcome the logical closure of the set of
sentences in K that are safe with respect to p [6]. All safe contractions are
partial meet contractions. Additional results on safe contraction have been
obtained by Rott [225].
Kernel contraction, introduced in [128], is a non-relational generalization
of safe contraction. Let Kp be the set of minimal p-implying subsets of K.
An incision function is a function σ that selects sentences to be discarded.
It satisfies the two basic properties (i) σ(K  p) ⊆ ⋃(K  p) and (ii) if ∅ =
X ∈ K  p, then X ∩ σ(K  p) = ∅. The kernel contraction ≈σ based on
σ is defined by the relationship K ≈σ p = K \ σ(K  p). The partial meet
contractions on a belief set coincide exactly with the kernel contractions that
satisfy the additional condition of smoothness, namely that if X ⊆ K and
Cn(X) ∩ σ(K  p) = ∅, then X ∩ σ(K  p) = ∅.
2.3 Epistemic Entrenchment
Epistemic entrenchment which was introduced in [107, 113] and [109] is a
binary relation ≤ on the sentences in the belief set K such that in contrac-
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tion, giving up beliefs with lower entrenchment is preferred to giving up
those with higher entrenchment. Entrenchment is assumed to satisfy transi-
tivity, dominance (if p 
 q then p ≤ q), conjunctiveness (either p ≤ p&q or
q ≤ p&q), minimality (non-elements of K are the sentences with minimal
entrenchment) and maximality (tautologies are the sentences with maximal
entrenchment). Entrenchment-based contraction is constructed such that for
all non-tautologous p: K ÷ p = {q ∈ K | q < p ∨ q}. A contraction operator is
an entrenchment-based contraction if and only if it is a transitively relational
partial meet contraction. Rott has investigated similar operations that are
based on entrenchment relations satisfying various weaker sets of conditions
[230, 232]. Other results on entrenchment have been obtained in [78, 199] and
elsewhere.
Alternatively, a contraction operator can be defined as follows: K ÷ p =
{q ∈ K | q < p}. This is severe withdrawal (also called mild contraction or
Rott’s contraction). It was axiomatized independently by Pagnucco and Rott
[237] and by Fermé and Rodriguez [86]. Arló-Costa and Levi have analyzed
it in terms of minimal loss of informational value [12]. It has been shown
to satisfy the implausible postulate of expulsiveness. (If  p and  q, then
either p ∈ K ÷ q or q ∈ K ÷ p) [133]. However, Lindström and Rabinowicz
have proposed that the truth lies somewhere between severe withdrawal and
the originally proposed entrenchment-based contraction [177]. This has been
called Lindström’s and Rabinowicz’s interpolation thesis [228].
2.4 Grove’s Spheres
In Grove’s possible world-modelling of belief revision, each logically closed set
X is represented by the set [X] of possible worlds including it, and similarly
each sentence p is represented by the set [p] of possible worlds including
it [117]. The expansion outcome K + p will then be represented by the set
[K + p] = [K] ∩ [p], and a contraction outcome K ÷ p by some superset
[K ÷ p] of [K] that includes at least one ¬p-world. The most remarkable result
in this framework is the equivalence between transitively relational partial
meet operations and operations based on a sphere system around the belief
set. Let S1, S2... be sets of possible worlds such that [K] ⊂ S1 and Sk ⊂ Sk+1
for all k. The contraction ÷ is a sphere-based contraction on K if and only if it
holds for all p that [K ÷ p] is the set of worlds obtained by adding to [K] all
the ¬p-worlds in the smallest sphere Sk that has any ¬p-world. Sphere-based
contraction coincides with transitively relational partial meet contraction (and
thus with entrenchment-based contraction). It has been used for instance in
analyses of iterated belief change [235].
Booth et al. have proposed a model of belief change that makes use of two
relations ≤ and  on possible worlds, instead of only one as in the standard
Grove model. Both relations represent plausibility, and  is a reflexive subre-
lation of ≤ [35].
AGM 25 Years 299
2.5 Distance Models
Several authors have proposed models of belief change that employ represen-
tations of similarity or distance. In [125] some variants of AGM contraction
operators were reconstructed in terms of a mechanism that selects those among
the eligible belief sets that are closest to the original belief set. Katsuno and
Mendelzon have shown how AGM revision can be reconstructed in terms
of a closeness relation that is used to ensure that changes are minimal [155].
Lehmann, Magidor and Schlechta have obtained close connections between
partial meet revision and models employing what they call pseudo-distances, a
generalization of the common notion of a distance [168].
2.6 Specified Meet Contraction
A belief set K is finite-based if there is some finite set S of sentences such that
Cn(K) = Cn(S). In a cognitively realistic model, we can expect the original
belief set to be finite-based, and the contraction operator should satisfy the
following postulate:
Finite-based outcome: If K is finite-based, then so is K ÷ p.
Not all partial meet contractions satisfy Finite-based outcome. Those that do
so have been shown to be reconstructible as specif ied meet contractions. A
specified meet contraction is defined by the relationship K ÷ p = K ∼ f (p),
where ∼ is full meet contraction and f is a function from and to the language.
Intuitively, f (p) is the sentence that is really removed in order to contract by
p. (Hence if we remove only q in order to contract by q&r then we can have
f (q&r) = q.) Various axioms for contraction, including the standard AGM
postulates, have been shown to correspond exactly to some property of the
sentential selector f [137, 138].
3 Criticism of the Model
Much of the critical discussion on the AGM model has referred either to the
postulates for partial meet contraction and revision (Sections 3.1 and 3.2) or to
the use of belief sets to represent belief states (Sections 3.3 and 3.4).
On philosophical issues relating to AGM see also [135] and [230].
3.1 The Recovery Postulate
By far the most criticized of the postulates is one of the basic postulates for
contraction:
Recovery: K ⊆ (K ÷ p) + p.
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Recovery is based on the intuition that we get all of the beliefs back after first
contracting and then expanding by the same belief [106]. However, counter-
examples have been constructed in which the recovery postulate seems to give
rise to implausible results. Suppose for instance that your original belief set K
contained the belief s that Cleopatra had a son. You receive information that
makes you contract the belief that she had a child (s ∨ d, where d denotes that
she had a daughter). You will then arrive at a belief set K ÷ (s ∨ d), and clearly
s /∈ K ÷ (s ∨ d). Now suppose that you receive more reliable information that
makes you expand your belief set by s ∨ d. We can then expect to have
s /∈ K ÷ (s ∨ d) + (s ∨ d), contrary to Recovery [121]. In a retort, Makinson
argued that the theories considered in this and similar examples are implicitly
“clothed” with additional justificational structure. In his view, Recovery re-
mains appropriate for “naked”, logically closed theories [187]. In a somewhat
similar vein, Glaister argued that this contraction is better represented by a
multiple contraction than by a contraction by s ∨ d [115].
Belief base models do not in general satisfy Recovery. (See Section 4.1.) In
Makinson’s terminology, operations that satisfy the other five basic contrac-
tion postulates but not Recovery are called withdrawals [185].
3.2 The Success Postulates
Partial meet revision satisfies the following postulate:
Revision success: p ∈ K ∗ p
Several authors have found this to be an implausible feature of belief revision,
even if p is not a contradiction [55, 132]. Similarly, one of the AGM postulates
for partial meet contraction:
Contraction success: If  p, then p /∈ K ÷ p.
has been contested on the ground that there may be sentences other than
tautologies that an epistemic agent may refuse to withdraw [226]. Operations
have been proposed that violate these two postulates. (See Section 6.2)
3.3 Are Belief Sets Too Large?
The use of a logically closed belief set to represent the belief state implies
that all beliefs are treated as if they have independent status. Suppose that
you believe that you have your keys in your pocket (p). It follows that you also
believe that either you have your keys in your pocket or the archbishop of York
is a quranist muslim (p ∨ q). However, p ∨ q has no independent standing;
it is in the belief set only because p is there. Therefore, if you give up your
belief in p we should expect p ∨ q to be lost directly, without the need for any
mechanism to deselect it. In the AGM framework, however, “merely derived”
beliefs such as p ∨ q have the same status as independently justified beliefs
such as p. Belief base models (to be discussed in Section 4.1) have largely been
constructed in order to make this distinction.
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Rott has pointed out that the logical closure of belief sets is unrealistic since
it assumes that epistemic agents are ideally competent concerning logic [230].
In the same article he argued that contrary to common assumptions, AGM is
not based on a principle of minimal change.
Since actual human agents have finite minds, a good case can be made
that a cognitively realistic model of belief change should be finitistic, and
this in two senses. First, both the original belief set and the belief sets that
result from a contraction should be finite-based, i.e. obtainable as the logical
closure of some finite set. Secondly, the outcome set, i.e. the class of belief sets
obtainable by contraction from the original belief set ({X | (∃p)(X = K ÷ p})
should be finite [127]. Partial meet contraction does not in general satisfy either
of these two finitistic criteria. This has led to the development of finitistic
models such as belief base models (Section 4.1) and specified meet contraction
(Section 2.6).
3.4 Lack of Information in the Belief Set
Belief sets have also been criticized for lacking important information. Most
importantly, AGM contraction or revision in its original form is a “one shot”
operation. After contracting K by p with the operation ∼γ we obtain a
new belief set K ∼γ p but no new selection function to be used in further
operations on this new belief set. In other words the original AGM framework
does not satisfy the principle of categorial matching, according to which the
representation of a belief state after a change should have the same format as
that of the belief state before the change [114]. In studies of iterated revision,
various ways to extend the belief state representation to solve this problem
have been investigated. (See Section 5.)
The lack of modal and conditional sentences in belief sets has often been
pointed out, but attempts to include them have given rise to severe difficulties.
The same applies to introspective beliefs, i.e. the agent’s beliefs about her own
belief state [91]. The inclusion of sentences referring to preferences and norms
has been somewhat more successful. (See Section 7.9.)
4 Extended Representations of Belief States
Many of the modifications of the AGM model that have been proposed consist
in extensions of the belief state representation that make it contain more
information in addition to what is contained in the belief set.
4.1 Belief Bases
A belief base is a set B of sentences such that a sentence p is believed if
and only if p ∈ Cn(B) [184, p. 357]. Operations on belief bases have been
extensively investigated [56, 77, 93, 95, 119, 120, 123, 129, 201, 229, 264].
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There are two major interpretations of belief bases. One of them, supported
by Dalal [56], uses belief bases as mere expressive devices; hence if Cn(B1) =
Cn(B2) then B1 and B2 represent the same belief state and yield the same
outcome under all operations of change. (“Irrelevance of syntax”, see [202].)
The other, more common approach treats inclusion in the belief base as
epistemically significant. The belief base contains those sentences that have
an epistemic standing of their own. Suppose that the belief set contains the
sentence s, “Shakespeare wrote Hamlet”. Due to logical closure it then also
contains the sentence s ∨ d, “Either Shakespeare wrote Hamlet or Charles
Dickens wrote Hamlet”. The latter sentence is a “mere logical consequence”
that should have no standing of its own [136]. In this approach, belief bases
increase the expressive power of the belief representation, since two belief
bases with the same logical closure can represent different ways to hold the
same beliefs. The two belief bases {p, q} and {p, p ↔ q} have the same logical
closure but will expectedly behave differently under operations of change;
revision by ¬p will result in {¬p, q} respectively {¬p, p ↔ q} [122]. In this
model, changes are made on the belief base, and the merely derived sentences
cannot survive when the basis of their derivation is lost. (This has been called
a f iltering condition [95].)
An input-driven operation ◦ on a belief base B gives rise to a base-generated
operation ◦′ on K = Cn(B), such that K ◦′ p = Cn(B ◦ p) for all p. Axiomatic
characterizations have been obtained of partial meet contraction and revision
on belief bases [122, 126] and of the base-generated operations that they give
rise to on belief sets [127]. Kernel contraction turns out to be a more general
operation than partial meet contraction when applied to belief bases [73, 128].
Belief bases make it possible to distinguish between different inconsistent
belief states. This can be used to construct two types of revision operators,
depending on whether the negation of the added sentence is contracted before
or after its addition:
B ∗ p = B ÷ ¬p + p (internal revision, Levi identity) [4]
B ∗ p = B + p ÷ ¬p (external revision, reversed Levi identity) [127]
The recovery postulate does not hold for partial meet contraction on belief
bases [121]. Johnson and Shapiro have investigated conditions under which
Recovery, or closely related properties, hold in belief base contraction, and
argued for the plausibility of some of these conditions [153].
Nebel has proposed belief base operations in which a complete, reflexive
and transitive relation over the elements of the belief base is used to pri-
oritize among its elements [202]. This approach was further developed by
Weyderts [266].
Epistemic entrenchment cannot be straightforwardly transferred to a belief
base framework. However, Williams showed how contraction can be based on
ensconcement relations, a related type of transitive and connective relation on
belief bases [269]. On ensconcement, see also [83].
AGM 25 Years 303
Di Giusto and Governatori have developed an approach in which the
elements of the belief base are divided into two categories, facts and rules.
Facts are removed if necessary to accommodate new facts. Rules are not
removed but can instead be changed. Hence, suppose that the belief base
contains the fact a&b and the two rules a → c and b → c. After revision by
the new fact ¬c, a new belief base is obtained that contains the facts a&b and
¬c and the two rules (a&¬b) → c and (b&¬a) → c [64].
Bochman has developed a theory of belief revision in which an epistemic
state is represented by a triple 〈S, <, l〉, where S is a set of objects called
admissible belief states, < a strict preference relation on these states, and l
a function that assigns a (logically closed) belief set to each element of S. One
and the same belief set may be assigned to several elements of S. This structure
shares many features with belief bases [27].
It is commonly assumed that the belief base approach corresponds to
foundationalist epistemology, whereas the original AGM framework repre-
sents a coherentist view [110, 255]. Doyle accepted this view but argued that
the epistemic concern for conservatism that underlies the coherentist view
applies equally to the foundations approach [66]. In [143] it was argued that
the original AGM approach is incompatible with important characteristics
of coherentism. In [134] coherentism was expressed in a framework where
a belief base B is assigned to the belief set K. Then a logically closed
subset K′ of K is coherent if and only if there is some sentence p such that
K′ = Cn(B ∼γ p).
4.2 Probability and Plausibility
The AGM model represents features of doxastic behaviour that differ from
those represented by probabilistic models. The degrees of belief represented
for instance by entrenchment relations do not coincide with probabilities [234].
It seems difficult to construct a reasonably manageable model that covers both
the logic-related and the probabilistic properties of belief change [165, 183].
However, some authors have explored the interrelations between the two
types of models. Lindström and Rabinowicz showed how belief revision can
be connected with accounts of conditional probability that allow the condition
to have probability zero [176]. Makinson further investigates this and other
connections between the two frameworks [191]. Insights from AGM can be
used as an impetus for considering accounts of conditional probability in
which p(q, r), the probability of q given r, is not defined in the standard
way. Furthermore, the notion of non-prioritized revision (see Section 6.2) can
be transferred to a probabilistic context where it corresponds to “vacuous”
conditionalizing when the condition is too unbelievable to be taken seriously.
Bonanno introduced what he called the qualitative Bayes rule, namely that
“... if at a state the information received is consistent with the initial beliefs—in
the sense that there are states that were considered possible initially and are
compatible with the information—then the states that are considered possible
according to the revised beliefs are precisely those states.” [30]. He constructed
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and characterized a model of belief revision that satisfies this condition. It
complies with the AGM postulates for partial meet revision.
Friedman and Halpern have developed a model based on a notion of
plausibility that is a generalization of probability. Instead of assigning to each
set A of sentences a number p(A) in [0, 1], representing its probability, they
assign to it an element Pl(A) of a partially ordered set. Pl(A) is called the
“plausiblity” of A. If Pl(A) ≤ Pl(B) then B is at least as plausible as A. A
sentence p is believed if and only if p is more plausible than ¬p. Changes
in belief take the form of changes in the plausibility ordering. Conditions on
such changes have been identified that produce a revision operator that is
essentially equivalent with partial meet revision [90, 92].
Several other authors have presented probability-based and plausibility-
based belief revision models that have close connections with the AGM model
[10, 13, 18, 69].
4.3 Ranking Models
In Spohn’s ranking theory of belief change a belief state is represented
by a ranking function κ that assigns a non-negative real number to each
possible world w, representing the agent’s degree of disbelief in w [249–
251]. A sentence p is is assigned the value κ(p) = min{κ(w) | p holds in w}.
Furthermore, p is believed if and only if κ(¬p) > 0, i.e., if and only if every
¬p-world is disbelieved to a non-zero degree. The conditional rank of q given
p is κ(q | p) = κ(p&q) − κ(p). For any sentence p and number x, the p → x-
conditionalization of κ is defined by: κp→x(q) = min{κ(q | p), κ(q | ¬p) + x}
Contractions, expansions and revisions can all be represented as condition-
alizations (depending on the numerical values involved). In addition, other
operations such as the strengthening or weakening of beliefs already held are
straightforwardly representable in this framework. Important results on belief
revision based on ranking functions, including an axiomatic representation that
clarifies their relationship to AGM operations, have been reported by Hild and
Spohn [147]. A generalization of Spohn’s ranking functions has been proposed
by Weydert [267].
4.4 Extensions of the Language
Belief revision theory has primarily been concerned with belief states and
inputs expressed in terms of classical sentential (truth-functional) logic. The
inclusion of non-truthfunctional expressions into the language has interesting
and often surprisingly drastic effects.
Among the several formal interpretations of non-truthfunctional condition-
als, such as counterfactuals, the Ramsey test is particularly well suited to belief
revision. The basic idea is that “if p then q” is taken to be believed if and only
if q would be believed after revising the present belief state by p. Let p  q
denote “if p then q”, or more precisely: “if p were the case, then q would be the
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case”. The Ramsey test says that p  q holds if and only if q ∈ K ∗ p [253].
In order to treat conditional statements like p  q on par with statements
about actual facts, they will have to be included in the belief set when they are
assented to by the agent, thus: p  q ∈ K if and only if q ∈ K ∗ p.
However, inclusion in the belief set of conditionals that satisfy the Ramsey
test requires radical changes in the logic of belief change. Hence, contraction
cannot then satisfy the inclusion postulate (K ÷ p ⊆ K) since contraction
typically provides support for conditional sentences that were not supported
by the original belief state. If I give up my belief that John is mentally retarded,
then I gain support for the conditional sentence “If John has lived 30 years in
London, then John understands the English language” [124].
A famous impossibility theorem by Gärdenfors shows that the Ramsey
test is incompatible with a set of plausible postulates for revision [108]. The
crucial part of the proof consists in showing that the Ramsey test implies
the following monotonicity condition: If K ⊆ K′ then K ∗ p ⊆ K′ ∗ p. This
condition is incompatible with the AGM postulates for revision, and it is also
easily shown to be implausible. Let K be a belief set in which you know nothing
specific about Ellen and K′ one in which you know that she is a lesbian. Let
p denote that she is married and q that she has a husband. Then we can have
K ⊆ K′ but q ∈ K ∗ p and q /∈ K′ ∗ p.
Several solutions to the impossibility theorem have been put forward. One
option is to reject the Ramsey test as a criterion for the validity of conditional
sentences [222]. Another, proposed by Levi, is to accept the test as a criterion
of validity but deny that such conditional sentences should be included in the
belief set when they are valid [172]. Levi and Arló-Costa have investigated
a weaker version of the Ramsey test that is not blocked by Gärdenfors’s
result and is also compatible with the AGM model [9, 11]. In a somewhat
similar vein, Lindström and Rabinowicz have proposed that a conditional
sentence expresses a determinate proposition about the world only relative to
the subject’s belief state. Given a conditional statement p  q and a belief
set K, there is some sentence rKpq such that p  q holds in the belief
state represented by K if and only if rKpq ∈ K. In this way we can have the
Ramsey test in the following form that is not blocked by the impossibility
result [178, 179]: rKpq ∈ K if and only if q ∈ K ∗ p. Yet another option is to
accept both the Ramsey test and the inclusion of conditional sentences into
the belief set. Then belief sets containing  will behave very differently
under operations of change than the common AGM belief sets, and the
standard AGM postulates will not hold [124, 223]. Ryan and Schobbens have
related the Ramsey test to update rather than revision (cf. Section 6.1) and
found the test to be compatible and indeed closely connected with update
operators [238].
Kern-Isberner has proposed a framework in which conditional sentences
can be elements of belief sets, and revisions can be performed with conditional
sentences as inputs [158]. A partly similar approach has been developed by
Weydert [268].
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The inclusion of modal sentences in belief sets has been investigated by
Fuhrmann. Let p denote that p is possible, and let p ∈ K hold if and only
if ¬p /∈ K. This seemingly reasonable definition gives rise to problems similar
to those exhibited in Gärdenfors’s theorem, and essentially the same types of
solutions have been discussed [94].
Lindström and Rabinowicz have investigated the inclusion into a belief
revision framework of introspective beliefs, i.e. allowing for Bp ∈ K, where Bp
denotes “I believe p”. Paradoxical results not dissimilar to those for condi-
tionals are obtained in this case as well [180]. Similar results were obtained by
Friedman and Halpern [91].
Dupin de Saint-Cyr and Lang introduced temporally labelled sentences into
belief revision and proposed a belief change operator, called belief extrapola-
tion, in which predictions are based on initial observations and a principle of
minimal change [70]. Bonanno has developed logics that contain both a next-
time temporal operator and a belief operator [31, 32].
Booth and Richter have developed a model of fuzzy revision on belief bases.
In this model, both the elements of the belief base and the input formulas come
attached with a numerical degree [42].
Finally, Fuhrmann has generalized partial meet operations to arbitrary
collections of (not necessarily linguistic) items that have a dependency struc-
ture satisfying the Armstrong axioms for dependency structures in database
relationships [96, 99].
4.5 Changes in Norms, Preferences, Goals, and Desires
Norms Although the AGM model was partly the outcome of attempts to
formalize changes in norms [5], authors who tried to apply the AGM model
to norms have found it in need of rather extensive modifications to make
it suitable for that purpose. Boella et al. analyzed normative change in a
framework with norms represented by sets of pairs 〈p, q〉, to be read “if p,
then it is obligatory that q”. In this framework, close analogues of the AGM
postulates give rise to inconsistency [29]. Governatori and Rotolo proposed a
model for changes in legislation that among several other aspects also includes
an explicit representation of time in order to account for phenomena such
as retroactivity [116]. Hansson and Makinson investigated the relationship
between changes and applications of a norm system. In order to apply a norm
system with conflicting norms to a particular situation, some of the norms may
have to be ignored. The problem of how to prioritize among conflicting items
is similar to the selection of sentences for removal [142].
Preferences A model of changes in preferences can be obtained by replacing
the standard AGM language by sentences of the form p ≥ q (“p is at least as
good as q”) and their truth-functional combinations. The acquisition of a new
preference takes the form of revision by such a preference sentence. Partial
meet contraction can be used, but some modifications of the AGM model seem
to be necessary in applications to preferences [118, 130, 166].
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Goals and Desires Intention selection is a process aimed at removing con-
tradictions, to end up with a consistent set of intentions [208]. Paglieri and
Castelfranchi have proposed a model of Data-oriented Belief Revision (DBR)
in which attention is paid to the mutual influences between beliefs and goals
[49–52, 207]. Boella et al. have also analyzed the role of goals in belief revision
[28]. Their model is similar to DBR in its selection criteria, but it puts more
emphasis on avoiding wishful thinking.
5 Iterated Change
An AGM contraction or revision takes us from a belief set to a new belief set.
In doing this, it makes use of a selection mechanism such as a selection function
or an entrenchment relation. However, it does not provide a new selection
mechanism to be used for further changes of the new belief set. The problem of
constructing models that allow for iterated change is probably the most studied
problem in the literature on belief change.
5.1 Revising Epistemic States
In order to solve the problem of iterated change we need a belief state
representation that contains more information than the belief set, so that it
can guide additional changes. Furthermore, the operation of change has to
yield a complete such belief state representation as its outcome, not merely a
new belief set. There are several ways to represent such an extended epistemic
state. The most common of these is a preorder on the set of possible worlds,
or equivalently a complete sphere system (cf. Section 2.4). The belief set can
be inferred from this preorder; it is simply the intersection of the worlds in the
highest equivalance class (the innermost sphere). An operation of change gives
rise to a new preorder (sphere system), from which the new belief set can be
inferred, and which can in its turn be subject to further changes, etc.
The most influential formulation of this approach is due to Darwiche and
Pearl [57]. To present it, let  be the current belief state of the agent, and 
the preorder that represents it. Similarly, let  ◦ p be the belief state obtained
after revising by p, and ◦p the preorder that represents it. (Following
tradition we will focus on revision; relatively little has been written on iterated
contraction.)
Darwiche and Pearl proposed the following conditions for iteration (μ and
φ are possible worlds):
(DP1): For any μ  p and φ  p, μ  φ iff μ ◦p φ.
(DP2): For any μ  ¬p and φ  ¬p, μ  φ iff μ ◦p φ.
(DP3): For any μ  p and φ  ¬p, if μ ≺ φ, then μ ≺◦p φ.
(DP4): For any μ  p and φ  ¬p, if μ  φ, then μ ◦p φ.
According to (DP1), the order among the p-worlds remains unchanged after
revision by p. According to (DP2) the order among the ¬p-worlds remains
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unchanged after revision by p. (DP3) says that if a p-world is strictly preferred
to a ¬p-world, then that strict preference is maintained after revision by p.
(DP4) says that if a p-world is weakly preferred to a ¬p-world, then that weak
preference is maintained after revision by p.
These conditions have been shown to correspond to the following postulates
for iterated revision: [57, Theorem 13.]
(DP1) If q 
 p, then ( ◦ p) ◦ q =  ◦ q.
(DP2) If q 
 ¬p, then ( ◦ p) ◦ q =  ◦ q.
(DP3) If  ◦ q 
 p, then ( ◦ p) ◦ q 
 p.
(DP4) If  ◦ q 
 ¬p, then ( ◦ p) ◦ q 
 ¬p
These four postulates have become the benchmark for iterated revision, and
new proposals are almost invariably compared to them. However, Jin and
Thielscher [149] and Booth and Meyer [37] have pointed out that these
postulates are too permissive since they do not rule out operators by which
all newly acquired information is given up as soon as an agent learns a fact
that contradicts some of its current beliefs. To avoid this they proposed the
following additional condition:
(Ind): For any μ  p and φ  ¬p, if μ  φ, then μ ≺◦p φ.
5.2 Major Classes of Iterable Operators
In a model of iterated belief revision there may be more than one way to
arrive at one and the same belief set. Does it make any difference for further
changes how we arrive at it? We can divide iterable operators into three classes
according to their ability to remember and to take the revision history into
account:
Operators Without Memory In this case, each belief set is revised in a pre-
determined way, independently of how it was obtained, i.e.:
If  ◦ p and ϒ ◦ p have the same belief set, then so have  ◦ p ◦ r and
ϒ ◦ p ◦ r.
Full meet revision is a trivial example of an iterable operator without memory.
Areces and Becher have analyzed this class of operators [8].
Operators with Full Memory In this case the full history of changes is con-
served, so that rollbacks of previous changes are possible. Operators with full
memory have been proposed, for example, by Brewka [46], by Lehmann [169],
and by Konieczny and Pérez [160]. Falappa et al. proposed another type of
revision in which discarded beliefs can be reused [74].
Operators with Partial Memory In this case it makes a difference for future
revisions how a belief set was arrived at, but the information remembered is
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not sufficient to identify the previous states. Most of the proposed iterable
revision operators are of this type. In a recent review Rott recognized three
major types of iterable revision operators. They all have partial memory [235]:
Conservative revision, originally called natural revision, has been studied
by Boutilier [44, 45] and Rott [233]. This operation is conservative in the
sense that it only makes the minimal changes of the preorder that are
needed to accept the input. In revision by p, the maximal p-worlds are
moved to the top of the preorder which is otherwise left unchanged. The
main characteristic of this operator is:
(Nat): If μ /∈ [ ◦ p] and φ /∈ [ ◦ p], then μ  φ iff μ ◦p φ.
Moderate revision, also called lexicographic revision, was originally studied
by Nayak [198] and by Nayak et al. [200]. When revising by p it rearranges
the preorder by putting the p-worlds at top (but conserving their relative
order) and the ¬p-worlds at bottom (but conserving their relative order).
It has the following property.
(Lex): If μ  p and φ  ¬p, then μ ≺◦p φ.
Radical revision is similar to moderate revision, but it differs in making
the new belief irrevocable, i.e., impossible to remove. Segerberg proposed
this type of revision and characterized it axiomatically [246]. It is further
investigated in [80]. In radical revision by p, the relative order of the p-
worlds is retained whereas the ¬p-worlds are removed from the preorder,
thus becoming inaccessible. The main characteristic of this operator is:
(Irr): [( ◦ p) ◦ ¬p] = ∅.
Delgrande, Dubois and Lang argue that since revision assumes a static world,
there is no reason why the outcome of an iterated revision should depend on
the order of the inputs. Therefore, they propose that iterated revision should
take the form of prioritized merging, a special case of multiple revision [61].
Several other types of iterable operators have been proposed, see for instance
[34, 41, 47, 151, 159, 204].
6 Alternative Operators of Change
In the original AGM model there are three major types of operators: contrac-
tion, revision, and expansion. Subsequently a large number of additional types
of operators have been proposed.
6.1 Update
In 1992, Katsuno and Mendelzon presented a type of operator of change that
they called update. Katsuno and Mendelzon [156] whereas revision operators
are suited to capture changes that reflect evolving knowledge about a static
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situation, update operators are intended to represent changes in beliefs that
result from changes in the objects of belief [272]. There are important for-
mal differences between update and AGM revision; in particular the AGM
postulate Vacuity (If K  ¬p then K + p ⊆ K ∗ p) does not hold for updates.
Update and its relation with revision have been further studied by Becher [23]
and others.
6.2 Non-prioritized Change
In AGM revision, new information has primacy. According to the success
postulate for revision, the system has total trust in the input information,
and previous beliefs are discarded whenever that is needed to consistently
incorporate the new information. This is an unrealistic feature since in real
life, cognitive agents sometimes do not accept the new information that
they receive. Belief revision that violates the success postulate is called non-
prioritized belief revision. Revision operators can be classified according to
their outcomes into the following five categories, of which the first is prioritized
and the other four non-prioritized [79]. We assume that the input sentence p
is consistent.
All. The input is accepted without any constraint: p ∈ K ◦ p.
Satisfied by AGM revision, external revision [126], and update [156].
All or nothing. Either the new input is accepted, or the belief set is left
unchanged: p ∈ K ◦ p or K ◦ p = K.
Satisfied by screened revision [188], credibility-limited revision [141], and
some applications of an improvement operator [161].
All or inconsistency. The input is accepted, but its negation may survive in
the belief set: p ∈ K ◦ p = Cn({⊥}) or K ◦ p = Cn({⊥}).
Satisfied by irrevocable belief revision [242] and also by revision by
comparison in the collapsed case [88].
All or less. Either the input is accepted or it induces a contraction process:
p ∈ K ◦ p or K ◦ p ⊆ K.
Satisfied by semi-revision [131] and revision by comparison in the unsuc-
cessful case [88].
All or a part. Either the whole input or a part of it is accepted. There is
then some q such that K ∗ p 
 q, 
 p → q and K ∗ p = K ∗ q.
Satisfied by selective revision [81], Rabinowicz’s and Schlechta’s revision
[216, 241], and Lin’s revision [174].
For an overview with emphasis on ‘all or nothing’ constructions, see [132].
The success postulate for contraction requires that all non-tautological
beliefs are retractable. This is not a fully realistic requirement, since actual
agents are known to have beliefs of a non-logical nature that nothing can bring
them to give up. In shielded contraction, the success postulate does not hold
in general; some non-tautological beliefs are shielded from contraction and
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cannot be given up. Shielded contraction has close connections with credibility-
limited revision [82, 84, 188].
Chopra, Ghose and Meyer have extended the framework of non-prioritized
belief revision by introducing non-beliefs as possible inputs that are ranked
along with beliefs [53].
6.3 Changes in the Strength of Beliefs
An operation of change can raise or lower the position of a sentence in the
ordering without affecting the belief set (but affecting how the belief state
responds to new inputs). Hence an operator of improvement, as proposed by
by Konieczny and Pérez [161] increases the plausibility of p by moving some
of the p-worlds to a higher position in the preorder. This can facilitate the
acceptance of p in later, additional operations, so that we can have p /∈ K ◦ p
but p ∈ K ◦ p ◦ p.
In quantitative theories of belief change, such as probabilistic and ranking
theories, the degree of acceptance of each sentence is represented by a
numerical value. However, the meaning of these numbers is not entirely clear
(especially not for non-probabilistic functions), and real agents are notoriously
bad at reasoning with them [154]. These difficulties are largely avoided if an
operation of change is constructed to adjust the position of an input sentence in
a ordering to be the same as that of a reference sentence. Since two sentences
are involved, Rott called such operators two-dimensional [235]. This kind of
operation was studied by Cantwell, who introduced the operations of raising
and lowering, whereby the degree of plausibility required for a sentence to
be included into the belief set is changed in either direction [47]. Fermé and
Rott proposed the operation of revision by comparison. It accepts the input
sentence p to the same degree as a previously believed sentence q, unless
the negation of the input sentence p is more plausible than the reference
sentence q, in which case q will be removed from the outcome [88]. Revision by
comparison violates the DP postulates since it collapses distinctions between
some ¬p-worlds. Rott has proposed a variant, bounded revision, that captures
the spirit of revision by comparison and also satisfies the DP postulates [236].
6.4 Resource-bounded Change and Inconsistency Management
AGM is a theory of changes of beliefs undertaken by highly idealized reason-
ers with unlimited cognitive capacities. In contrast, real reasoners such as hu-
mans, computers, and robots have limited resources. As was noted by Wasser-
mann, it is important to distinguish between a limited implementation of a
theory for ideal reasoning, and a theory for reasoners with limited resources
[264]. Harman has put forward a highly useful list of principles that should be
valid for any resource-bounded agent [145]. As was observed by Gabbay and
Hunter, for a real agent it may not be necessary to restore consistency, but it
may be sufficient to have rules that specify how to act when an inconsistency
arises [101]. The two features of resource-boundedness that have attracted
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most attention among researchers are finitude and inconsistency tolerance.
Both belief bases and specified meet contraction have been constructed largely
in order to avoid the infinite structures of the standard AGM model.
Doyle has investigated characteristics of real agents such as mental inertia
and constitutional elasticity [67]. His reason maintenance system (RMS) is in-
tended to capture these characteristics. Alechina et al. used RMS to construct
a resource-bounded operator of contraction [7].
In the AGM model there is only one inconsistent belief set, namely the
whole language. Belief bases fare much better in this respect; there are many
different inconsistent belief bases that can represent different inconsistent
states [120]. This feature of belief bases was employed in Hansson’s and
Wasserman’s model of local change [144]. Given a belief base B and a sentence
r, the r-compartment of B is the subset of B that is relevant for r. Revision
of B by r involves changes only of the r-compartment; hence a part of the
belief base can be made consistent while the belief base as a whole remains
inconsistent. Wassermann has also investigated a construction with a short-
term memory in which recently computed results are temporarily stored [263].
Local change can be used for diagnosis [265], i.e. the process of finding the
faulty compartment of a malfunctioning system [218].
In a similar vein, Parikh [212] proposed a principle for relevance-sensitive
change according to which, if the belief set can be split into two independent
parts (expressed in different sublanguages), then revision of one part does not
affect the other. Peppas provided a semantics for this principle in terms of sys-
tems of spheres [213]. Kourousias and Makinson have investigated conditions
under which Parikh’s relevence-sensitive condition is satisfied [164, 190].
Another approach to inconsistencies is to use a paraconsistent logic (i.e. a
logic where {p ∧ ¬p} |∼ q does not hold in general) [215, 254].
6.5 Multiple Change
In the original AGM model the input is a single sentence. In models of multiple
change, the input is a set of sentences. Arguments have been given why no two
of the four contractions K ÷ p ÷ q, K ÷ q ÷ p, K ÷ {p, q}, and K ÷ (p ∨ q)
should be expected to coincide in general [100]. However, it has been argued
that the order-dependence of iterated operations is in itself problematic since
ideally we should treat the pieces of information that we receive on an equal
footing, independently of the order in which they arrive [61, 140].
Fuhrmann and Hansson identified two types of multiple contraction. In
package contraction all members of an input set A are removed, hence (K ÷
A) ∩ A = ∅. In choice contraction it is only required that at least one member
of the input set be removed, i.e. A  K ÷ A [100]. Zhang has added a third
option, set contraction. Its purpose is not to remove the input but to make the
outcome compatible with the input. Hence, the outcome K  A satisfies the
property (K  A) ∪ A  ⊥ [273].
Most of the major AGM-related contraction operators have been general-
ized to multiple contraction: multiple partial meet contraction [100, 119, 173],
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multiple kernel contraction [89], multiple specified meet contraction [140], and
a multiple version of Grove’s sphere system [85, 217]. Spohn has proposed a
ranking-theoretic account of multiple package contraction [252]. Fuhrmann
has investigated the subtraction p − q that asserts p with the exception of
what q says, and the merge operation p ◦ q that extracts the maximized
consistent content from p and q jointly [97, 98]. Finally, Zhang has investigated
operations that are both iterated and multiple [274].
6.6 Indeterministic Change
The AGM model and most other models of belief change are deterministic
in the sense that the outcome is always well-determined. There is no scope
for chance in determining the outcome of the change. In indeterministic belief
change, an operation can have more than one admissible outcome. Indeter-
ministic belief change has been studied by Gallier [105] and by Lindström and
Rabinowicz [177]. The latter authors gave up the assumption that epistemic
entrenchment satisfies connectedness. This resulted in Grove’s sphere systems
with “fallbacks” that are not linearly ordered but still all include the original
belief set.
6.7 Some Other Operators of Change
Consolidation An inconsistent belief base can be consolidated, i.e. made
consistent by removing some of its elements. The consolidation of B is denoted
B!. A plausible way to perform consolidation is to contract by falsum (contra-
diction), i.e. B! = B ÷ ⊥ [131]. In Olsson’s coherence consolidation, enough of
an incoherent belief base is removed to make it coherent [205].
Replacement replaces one sentence by another. Such an operator has two
variables, such that in K|pq , p has been replaced by q. This operation can have
outcomes that are not obtainable through either partial meet contraction or
partial meet revision. Replacement can also be used as a kind of Sheffer stroke
for belief change, since contraction, revision, and expansion can all be defined
in terms of it. (K ÷ p = K |p, K ∗ p = K |⊥p , and K + p =|p .) Partial meet
replacement has been axiomatically characterized, and it also has a semantic
account in terms of possible worlds [139].
Reconsideration introduced by Johnson and Shapiro [151, 152] is a non-
prioritized operation on belief bases. It represents changes that are performed
in hindsight in order to eliminate negative effects caused by previously per-
formed changes, such as the reintroduction of previously removed beliefs. This
operation can be produced by an algorithm that examines a subset of the
retracted basic beliefs using dependency relationships.
Multiagent Belief Change AGM operations can be extended to cover changes
performed jointly by more than one agent, who are assumed to combine
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their beliefs in order to obtain a common, consistent set of beliefs. Konieczny
and Perez have proposed an operator called merging that generalizes several
previously proposed methods for conflict-solving combinations of information
from two agents [162, 163]. For more than two agents, early work by Revesz
[219] and Lin [174], based on distances between models, has been followed by
several other approaches [19, 68, 182, 193, 194].
7 Applications and Connections
The AGM model has turned out to have a surprising number of connections
with other areas of research.
7.1 Non-Monotonic and Defeasible Logic
In spite of the differences between belief revision and non-monotonic logic
[111] it is possible to translate concepts, models, and results between these
areas [192]. Non-monotonic reasoning can be expressed by an inference oper-
ator |∼ such that A |∼ p denotes that A is a good enough reason to believe
that p, or that p is a plausible consequence of A. However, contrary to Cn, C
does not satisfy monotony (If A ⊆ B then Cn(A) ⊆ Cn(B)). Given a belief set
K representing the background beliefs we can translate formulas between the
two frameworks as follows:
p |∼ q if and only if q ∈ K ∗ p
Belief revision and non-monotonic logic have become increasingly intercon-
nected. Satoh provided a model of belief change (“minimal revision”) that
satisfies the AGM postulates except Vacuity and Conjunctive overlap. It can
be interpreted as a non-monotonic reasoning operator [240]. Lindström [175]
and Rott [227] have shown that belief revision and non-monotonic logic are
closely connected through their reconstructibility in terms of choice functions
satisfying various rationality postulates. Other contributions in this tradition
are [186, 224]. Billington et al. further clarified the relationships between AGM
revision and non-monotonic inference [26].
In the last years of his life Alchourrón published a series of articles on
the logic of defeasible conditionals [1–3]. He proposed that conditional con-
structions in ordinary language can often be understood as saying that an
antecedent p together with a set of assumptions is a sufficient condition for the
consequent q. Such conditionals can be represented by a formula ( f (p) →
q), where f (p) is a function that takes us from p to the conjunction of p
and its presuppositions. The connection between this approach and AGM was
initially somewhat unclear [24], but in [87] axioms were given that relate it to
a generalized version of AGM revision for an implicit underlying belief set K.
This shows that there are close connections between Alchourrón’s approach
and Pagnucco’s concept of abductive expansion which is also closely associated
with non-monotonic inference [211].
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7.2 Description Logic
Description logics have been successful in detecting incoherences in databases,
but provide little support for resolving these incoherences. Methodologies
for belief change can be used to improve their performance in that respect.
Techniques for ontology debugging are closely related to the identification of
the kernel set in kernel (and safe) contraction. Using proposals by Benferhat
et al. [25] and Meyer et al. [196] developed strategies for solving incoherences
in a framework based on description logic. Ribeiro and Wassermann proposed
a belief revision approach to finding and repairing inconsistencies in ontologies
represented in description logics [220].
7.3 Horn Clause Contraction Functions
A Horn clause is a disjunction of one positive literal and at least one negated
literal, such as p1 ∨ ¬p2 ∨ ¬p3 ∨ ¬p4. With few exceptions [77, 221], studies
of Horn clause belief change started only recently. Delgrande [60] investigated
the contraction of theories expressed in propositional Horn logic and proposed
two approaches that he called entailment-based and inconsistency-based [60].
For each of these he proposed a special kind of partial meet (and maxichoice)
contraction. Delgrande and Wassermann [63] found that the application of
contraction operators to remainder sets (as in AGM) has undesirable prop-
erties in Horn clause logic. Instead they developed an account of maxichoice
Horn contraction that operates on weak remainder sets (defined semantically
instead of syntactically).
Booth et al. provided a generalization of Delgrande’s partial meet con-
structions and proposed that the latter are only a subset of the appropriate
constructions of contraction in Horn logic [39] (cf. [100]). Booth et al. [40]
also showed that their construction corresponds exactly to standard kernel
contraction, as applied to Horn clauses. For further work on contraction in
Horn logic, see [167, 276].
7.4 Game Theory
Belief change and game theory are related in several ways. Booth and Meyer
[38] investigated equilibria in belief merging. The key idea is that a social belief
removal function can be a minimal change in the AGM sense. Two classes of
removal functions for agents have been studied: basic and hyperregular re-
moval. The former has been axiomatically characterized by Booth [36]. Zhang
studied bargaining from another viewpoint, proposing a logical axiomatization
of bargaining solutions that is based on postulates from AGM and game theory
[275].
The classical analysis of centipedes in the game theoretical literature (by
Aumann, Binmore and others) shows that adequate models should be able
to represent belief-contravening hypotheses and therefore also the notion
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of supposition. Samet [239] proposed that hypothetical knowledge can be
represented by the operator: KHi (E) =
⋃
{P ∈ i: Ti(P, H) ⊆ E}, where i
is a partition cell and Ti is a transformation function mapping partition cells
and hypotheses to partition cells. This transformation function has the flavour
of belief change but it is constrained by properties not used in the literature on
belief change. Arló-Costa and Bicchieri proposed an operator of this sort that
satisfies some of the AGM properties. They developed models in which the
condition that all players are disposed to behave rationally at all nodes is both
necessary and sufficient for them to choose the backward induction solution in
centipede games. This result was obtained without assuming that rationality is
commonly known (as in [20]) or commonly hypothesized by the players (as in
[239]).
7.5 Argumentation
Falappa et al. [76] have argued that belief revision and argumentation theory
are complementary approaches. By combining the two, the variety and com-
plexity of reasoning processes is better accounted for than if only one of them
is used. In [75], they combine ATMS (Assumption-based truth-maintenance
systems) [58] with belief revision and propose a system that uses argumentative
structures in the form of explanations for non-prioritized revisions of a belief
base B. In this model, an epistemic input is composed of a sentence p and a set
A of reasons to believe it. A partial acceptance revision operator is constructed
such that A is initially accepted, which leads to the creation of B ∪ A as a
(possibly inconsistent) intermediate belief base from which inconsistencies are
removed, giving rise to a consistent revised belief base B◦ A. The operator ◦ is
an operator of external revision in the sense explained in Section 4.1.
Paglieri and Castelfranchi proposed Data-oriented Belief Revision (DBR)
as an alternative to AGM [50, 208]. This model combines belief revision with
argumentation, following Toulmin’s account of argumentation. The applica-
tion of DBR to argumentation is primarily intended to highlight structural
communalities between arguments and belief-supporting networks [209, 210].
The model contains two basic informational categories, data and beliefs.
Contrary to beliefs, data are allowed to be contradictory. When a belief is
abandoned, this does not entail removal of the corresponding data from the
agent’s memory, i.e. disbelieving is not forgetting.
7.6 Modal and Dynamic Logics
We can distinguish between three ways to integrate belief revision with a
modal logic.1 First, we can add epistemic or doxastic modal operators to make
it explicit in the logical language that the belief set consists of beliefs. Secondly,
1This section relies heavily on personal communications from Hans van Ditmarsch.
AGM 25 Years 317
we can formalize the execution of expansion, revision, and contraction with
dynamic modal operators, similar to those for program execution. Thirdly, we
can add both epistemic and dynamic modal operators, to integrate belief and
belief change in one language; this has been done in dynamic doxastic logic by
Segerberg and collaborators and largely separately from that, later in dynamic
epistemic logic.
A reason to investigate belief revision in modal logic is that the theories
of belief change developed within the AGM tradition are not logics in a
strict sense, but rather informal axiomatic theories of belief change. Instead
of characterizing the models of belief and belief change in a formalized object
language, the AGM approach uses a natural language (ordinary mathemat-
ical English) to characterize the mathematical structures under study. The
approaches to be mentioned here “internalize” the operations of belief change
into the object language.
Explicit Belief Operators An early approach was closely connected to non-
prioritized belief revision. Let Bp denote that p is believed by the agent. ThenBp can denote that p is necessarily believed, i.e., it is believed and no amount
of epistemic input can change this. ¬Bp means that it is possible to arrive at
some state of belief in which p is not believed. B signifies that it is possible
to arrive at some state in which p is believed and can after that no longer be
disbelieved, etc. Depending on the details of the revision process, this can be
shown to give rise to either an S4.2 or an S4 logic for the modal operator [129].
Dynamic Modalities for Belief Revision In various publications, van
Benthem, de Rijke, and Fuhrmann [59, 95, 256, 257] introduced an “update
logic” including the following notation:
[÷p]q (q holds after contraction by p)
[∗p]q (q holds after revision by p)
[+p]q (q holds after expansion by p)
This update logic can be seen as a precursor of subsequent treatments of belief
change in dynamic logic.
Dynamic Doxastic Logic (DDL) extends propositional logical theories of
formulas with both Hintikka-style doxastic operators [148] and dynamic modal
operators for belief change [243–245]. It was defined by Krister Segerberg
as a logical framework for reasoning about doxastic change. The basic DDL
represents an agent that has opinions about the external world and an ability
to change these opinions in the light of new information. Such an agent is
non-introspective in the sense that it lacks opinions about its own belief states,
for example B[∗p]q is not a well-formed formula. Lindström and Rabinowicz
extended this model in order to include such formulas [181]. The extended
model allows not only for introspective agents but also for iterated change,
which has been studied by John Cantwell [47].
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Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) also studies changes in information and
investigates actions with epistemic impact on agents [21, 214, 262]. Like DDL it
has epistemic operators for belief or for knowledge and also dynamic operators
for changes in belief or knowledge. The best-studied dynamics is that of the
public announcement of a formula φ. This can—with many reservations—be
seen as a kind of belief expansion with φ. One such reservation is that the
postulate of success is not necessarily satisfied: after public announcement
of φ it need not be the case that Bφ is true, i.e., that φ is believed. The
standard counterexample is the Moore-sentence p ∧ ¬Bp [148, 197]. Clearly,
B(p ∧ ¬Bp) is inconsistent for standard notions of knowledge and belief. In
DEL, the Moore-sentence is just one example of an unsuccessful update, see
[260].
Belief revision in the typical AGM sense is more problematic. If the agent
believes in p (i.e., Bp is true), then a public announcement of ¬p will make her
or his beliefs inconsistent. To model belief revision in DEL, we need Kripke
models where knowledge, belief, and degrees of belief (or conditional belief)
can all be encoded. To achieve this we can add plausibility relations to the
Kripke models, and identify belief in φ with truth of φ in the most plausible of
the epistemically accessible states.
For example, suppose that two states s and t are both considered possible by
an agent, but (s)he considers s to be more plausible than t. Furthermore sup-
pose that p holds in s but not in t. Then the agent believes that p. Belief revision
with ¬p revises the plausibilities such that t becomes more plausible than s.
Now, the agent believes that p is false: B¬p. So we have Bp ∧ [∗¬p]B¬p,
where [∗¬p] is not a ‘hard’ (i.e., truthful) public announcement but a tentative
or ‘soft’ (i.e., preference changing) public announcement. An alternative belief
revision mechanism in the DEL setting is when the state s is eliminated from
consideration (a ‘hard’ update, as for the execution of public announcements),
after which the t is the most plausible (namely the only remaining) state. Again,
the agent believes that p is false. These issues were addressed by Aucher [17], van
Benthem [258], van Ditmarsch and Labuschagne [259, 261], and Baltag and
Smets [22] (with many follow-up papers). Conditional reasoning and reasoning
with different degrees of belief can also be modelled in such settings.
7.7 Belief Change by Translation Between Logics
The AGM paradigm can be extended to non-classical logics by translating the
source logic into classical logic, performing the change and then translating
back. This method was proposed independently by two groups. Gabbay et al.
[102, 103] respectively Coniglio and Carnielli [54]. The latter defined logics
as two-sorted first-order structures, and argued that this broad definition
encompasses a wide class of logics with theoretical interest as well as interest
from the point of view of applications. The language, concepts and methods of
model theory can be used to describe the relationships between logics through
morphisms of structures called transfers. They define a model of belief change,
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called Wide Belief Revision Systems, to define belief revision for non-standard
logics.
7.8 Truth
In eliminative induction a number of possible hypotheses concerning some
state of affairs are presumed, and rivals are progressively eliminated by
new evidence. The process is an idealization, since in practice no closed set
of initial theories is usually available. Kelly found similarities between the
process of eliminative induction and theory change, and proposed the use of
belief revision to arrive at informative, true, empirical belief on the basis of
increasing information. He analyzed several algorithms of iterated revision
(see Section 5), assuming that learning is based on the outcomes of sequential
experiments [157].
7.9 Use of Choice Functions and Related Preference Orderings
The classical theory of rational choice was developed by mathematical econo-
mists [15, 16, 247]. It occupies a central role in the philosophy of the social
sciences.
Choice rationality is concerned with how to choose rationally among a set
of alternatives. Formal requirements are imposed on choices from different,
overlapping alternative sets. The standard presumption is that selection func-
tions are rationalizable in terms of some underlying binary preference relation.
Formally, this is represented in structures containing a set of alternatives 	
and a function f that takes us from any subset E of 	 to a subset of E.
The main objective of rational choice theory is to investigate the conditions
under which the function f can be rationalized by a total pre-order R on 	 in
the sense that, for every E ⊆ 	, f (E) coincides with the best elements of E
according to R. However, as discussed by Sen [248], social norms and menu
dependence can make rationalizability in terms of an underlying preference
relation impossible.
The structures studied in rational choice theory have a close connection
with the selection functions employed in belief revision. In his book [231],
Rott relates belief revision, non-monotonic reasoning and rational choice, and
shows how standard postulates of belief change and non-monotonic reasoning
correspond to the constraints of classical theories of rational choice. According
to Rott, these connections constitute an important bridge between practical
and theoretical rationality.
Olsson [206] conceded that Rott’s work is indisputable as a formal
achievement, but puts his philosophical conclusions in question. According to
Olsson, Rott has not discovered any surprising connections between revision
and choice. Instead he has reconnected the AGM theory with its roots in
counterfactual reasoning and rational choice.
Further studies in this area have been reported by Arló-Costa and Pedersen
[14] and by Bonanno [33].
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8 Computability and Implementation
Belief revision has usually been studied from the viewpoint of ideal agents
(resource bounded or not). The performance of belief change operations in a
computer or robot gives rise to new challenges. From a practical point of view
we have to deal with actual limitations in memory, reasoning, accuracy, etc.
From a theoretical point of view the computational tractability of the proposed
algorithms is a major challenge.
In the 1980’s several algorithms for the implementation of belief change
operations were proposed. Most of them were constructed to recognize which
beliefs are supported and how, and to perform changes while minimizing the
number of (usually atomic) sentences to be changed. Major examples are
the algorithms proposed by Doyle, [65], Borgida [43], Winslett [272], Dalal
[56] and Satoh [240]. Katsuno and Mendelzon [155] provided an overview of
several of these approaches.
Two logics suitable for supporting belief revision systems have been pro-
posed. The first of these was due to Martins and Shapiro (in an early paper that
also described an actual implementation) [195], and the second to Gabbay et al.
[104]. Recent works on implementation also include proposals by Williams
[270], Williams and Sims [271], and Delgrande and Schaub [62].
A core aspect in implementation is the space and time required for com-
putation. One of the first studies of the cost of belief change algorithms was
performed by Eiter and Gottlob [71]. In a survey written in 1998 Nebel said:
“The general revision problem for propositional logic appears to be
hopelessly infeasible from a computational point of view because they
are located on the second level of the polynomial hierarchy” [203].
However, specific algorithms can reduce this computational cost. The deter-
mination of what properties have to be resigned in order to gain efficiency
is a major challenge for future studies. An interesting step was taken by Jin
and Thielscher who proposed a model called Reinforcement Belief Revision
that combines two important desiderata for belief change implementations: It
satisfies the standard rationality postulates, and the time and space required
for its implementation can be assessed [150].
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essays dedicated to Lennart Ȧqvist on his f iftieth birthday (pp. 88–101).
AGM 25 Years 325
107. Gärdenfors, P. (1984). Epistemic importance and minimal changes of belief. Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, 62, 136–157.
108. Gärdenfors, P. (1986). Belief revisions and the Ramsey test for conditionals. Philosophical
Review, 95, 81–93.
109. Gärdenfors, P. (1988). Knowledge in f lux: Modeling the dynamics of epistemic states.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
110. Gärdenfors, P. (1990). The dynamics of belief systems: Foundations versus coherence theo-
ries. Reveu Internationale de Philosophie, 44, 24–46.
111. Gärdenfors, P. (1991). Belief revision and nonmonotonic logic: Two sides of the same coin?.
In J. Mvan Eijck (Ed.), Logics in AI. European workshop JELIA ’90 Amsterdam, The
Netherlands, 10–14 September, 1990 Proceedings. Lecture notes in computer science (Vol. 478,
pp. 52–54).
112. Gärdenfors, P. (2011). Notes on the history of ideas behind AGM (this issue).
113. Gärdenfors, P., & Makinson, D. (1988). Revisions of knowledge systems using epistemic
entrenchment. In M. Y. Vardi (Ed.), Proceedings of the second conference on theoretical
aspects of reasoning about knowledge (pp. 83–95). Los Altos.
114. Gärdenfors, P., & Rott, H. (1993). Belief revision. In D. M. Gabbay, C. J. Hogger, &
J. A. Robinson (Eds.), Handbook of logic in artif icial intelligence and logic programming.
Epistemic and temporal reasoning (Vol. 3, pp. 35–132). Oxford University Press.
115. Glaister, S. M. (2000). Recovery recovered. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 29, 171–
206.
116. Governatori, G., & Rotolo, A. (2010). Changing legal systems: Legal abrogations and annul-
ments in defeasible logic. Logic Journal of IGPL, 18(1), 157–194.
117. Grove, A. (1988). Two modellings for theory change. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 17,
157–170.
118. Grüne-Yanoff, T., & Hansson, S. O. (2009). From belief revision to preference change. In
T. Grüne-Yanoff, & S. O. Hansson (Eds.), Preference change: Approaches from philosophy,
economics and psychology (pp. 159–184). Springer.
119. Hansson, S. O. (1989). New operators for theory change. Theoria, 55, 114–132.
120. Hansson, S. O. (1991). Belief base dynamics. Ph.D. thesis, Uppsala University.
121. Hansson, S. O. (1991). Belief contraction without recovery. Studia Logica, 50, 251–260.
122. Hansson, S. O. (1992). A dyadic representation of belief. In P. Gärdenfors (Ed.), Belief
revision. Cambridge tracts in theoretical computer science (Vol. 29, pp. 89–121). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
123. Hansson, S. O. (1992). In defense of base contraction. Synthese, 91, 239–245.
124. Hansson, S. O. (1992). In defense of the Ramsey test. The Journal of Philosophy, 89,
522–540.
125. Hansson, S. O. (1992). Similarity semantics and minimal changes of belief. Erkenntnis, 37,
401–429.
126. Hansson, S. O. (1993). Reversing the Levi identity. Journal of Philosophycal Logic, 22, 637–
669.
127. Hansson, S. O. (1993). Theory contraction and base contraction unified. Journal of Symbolic
Logic, 58, 602–625.
128. Hansson, S. O. (1994). Kernel contraction. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 59, 845–859.
129. Hansson, S. O. (1994). Taking belief bases seriously. In D. Prawitz, & D. Westerståhl
(Eds.), Logic and philosophy of science in Uppsala (pp. 13–28). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers.
130. Hansson, S. O. (1995). Changes in preference. Theory and Decision, 38, 1–28.
131. Hansson, S. O. (1997). Semi-revision. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logic, 7(1–2), 151–
175.
132. Hansson, S. O. (1999). A survey of non-prioritized belief revision. Erkenntnis, 50, 413–427.
133. Hansson, S. O. (1999). A textbook of belief dynamics. Theory change and database updating.
Applied logic series. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
134. Hansson, S. O. (2000). Coherentist contraction. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 29,
315–330.
135. Hansson, S. O. (2003). Ten philosophical problems in belief revision. Journal of Logic and
Computation, 13, 37–49.
326 E Fermé, S.O. Hansson
136. Hansson, S. O. (2006). Logic of belief revision. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The stanford
encyclopedia of philosophy. The Metaphysics Research Lab. Center for the Study of Lan-
guage and Information. Stanford University. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-belief-
revision/.
137. Hansson, S. O. (2007). Contraction based on sentential selection. Journal of Logic and
Computation, 17, 479–498.
138. Hansson, S. O. (2008). Specified meet contraction. Erkenntnis, 69, 31–54.
139. Hansson, S. O. (2009). Replacement—a sheffer stroke for belief revision. Journal of Philo-
sophical Logic, 38, 127–149.
140. Hansson, S. O. (2010). Multiple and iterated contraction reduced to single-step single-
sentence contraction. Synthese, 173, 153–177.
141. Hansson, S. O., Fermé, E., Cantwell, J., & Falappa, M. (2001). Credibility-limited revision.
Journal of Symbolic Logic, 66(4), 1581–1596.
142. Hansson, S. O., & Makinson, D. (1997). Applying normative rules with restraint. In M.
L. Dalla Chiara et al. (Eds.), Logic and scientif ic method (pp. 313–332). Kluwer Academic
Publishers.
143. Hansson, S. O., & Olsson E. (1999). Providing foundations for coherentism. Erkenntnis, 51,
243–265.
144. Hansson, S. O., & Wassermann, R. (2002). Local change. Studia Logica, 70(1), 49–76.
145. Harman, G. (1986). Change in view—principles of reasoning. Cambridge York: MIT Press.
146. Harper, W. (1977). Rational conceptual change. In T. U. of Chicago Press (Ed.), PSA:
Proceedings of the biennial meeting of the philosophy of science association. Symposia and
invited papers (Vol. 2, pp. 462–494).
147. Hild, M., & Spohn, W. (2008). The measurement of ranks and the laws of iterated contraction.
Artif icial Intelligence, 172, 1195–1218.
148. Hintikka, J. (1962). Knowledge and belief: An introduction to the logic of the two notions.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
149. Jin, Y., & Thielscher, M. (2007). Iterated belief revision, revised. Artif icial Intelligence, 171,
1–18.
150. Jin, Y., & Thielscher, M. (2008). Reinforcement belief revision. Journal of Logic and Com-
putation, 18, 783–813.
151. Johnson, F. L. (2006). Dependency-directed reconsideration: An anytime algorithm for hind-
sight knowledge-base optimization. Ph.D. thesis, State University of New York at Buffalo.
152. Johnson, F. L., & Shapiro, S. C. (2005). Dependency-directed reconsideration: Belief base op-
timization for truth maintenance systems. In Proceedings of the twentieth national conference
on artif icial intelligence (AAAI-05) (pp. 313–320).
153. Johnson, F. L., & Shapiro, S. C. (2005). Improving recovery for belief bases. In L. Morgen-
stern, & M. Pagnucco (Eds.), IJCAI-05 workshop on nonmonotonic reasoning, action, and
change (NRAC’05) (pp. 65–70). Edinburgh.
154. Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and
biases. New York: Cambridge University Press.
155. Katsuno, H., & Mendelzon, A. (1991). Propositional knowledge base revision and minimal
change. Journal of Artif icial Intelligence, 52, 263–294.
156. Katsuno, H., & Mendelzon, A. (1992). On the difference between updating a knowledge
base and revising it. In P. Gärdenfors (Ed.), Belief revision. Cambridge tracts in theoretical
computer science (Vol. 29, pp. 183–203). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
157. Kelly, K. (1998). Iterated belief revision, reliability, and inductive amnesia. Erkenntnis, 50,
11–58.
158. Kern-Isberner, G. (2004). A thorough axiomatization of a principle of conditional preser-
vation in belief revision. Annals of Mathematics and Artif icial Intelligence, 40(1–2), 127–
164.
159. Kern-Isberner, G. (2008). Linking iterated belief change operations to nonmonotonic reason-
ing. In G. Brewka, & J. Lang (Eds.), Proceedings 11th international conference on knowledge
representation and reasoning, KR’2008 (pp. 166–176). Menlo Park, CA.
160. Konieczny, S., & Pérez, R. P. (2000). A framework for iterated revision. Journal of Applied
Non-Classical Logics, 10(3–4), 339–367.
161. Konieczny, S., & Perez, R. P. (2008). Improvement operators. In Eleventh international
conference on principles of knowledge representation and reasoning (KR’08) (pp. 177–186).
AGM 25 Years 327
162. Konieczny, S., & Perez, R. P. (2011). Logic based merging (this issue).
163. Konieczny, S., & Pérez, R. P. (2002). Merging information under constraints: A logical
framework. Journal of Logic and Computation, 12(5), 773–808.
164. Kourousias, G., & Makinson, D. (2007). Parallel interpolation, splitting, and relevance in
belief change. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 72(3), 994–1002.
165. Kyburg, H. E. (1961). Probability and the logic of rational belief. Middletown: Wesleyan
University Press.
166. Lang, J., & van der Torre, L. (2008). From belief change to preference change. In M. Ghallab,
C. D. Spyropoulos, N. Fakotakis, & N. M. Avouris (Eds.), ECAI 2008—18th European
conference on artif icial intelligence, Patras, Greece, 21–25 July, 2008, Proceedings. Frontiers
in artif icial intelligence and applications (Vol. 178, pp. 351–355).
167. Langlois, M., Szörényi, R. H. S. B., & Turán, G. (2008). Horn complements: Towards horn-
to-horn belief revision. In Twenty-third AAAI conference on artif icial intelligence (AAAI-08)
(pp. 466–471). AAAI Press.
168. Lehmann, D., Magidor, M., & Schlechta, K. (2001). Distance semantics for belief revision.
Journal of Symbolic Logic, 66(1), 295–317.
169. Lehmann, D. J. (1995). Belief revision, revised. In Proceedings of the fourteenth international
joint conference on artif icial intelligence (IJCAI’95) (pp. 1534–1540).
170. Levi, I. (1977). Subjunctives, dispositions, and chances. Synth̀ese, 34, 423–455.
171. Levi, I. (1980). The enterprise of knowledge. Cambridge: MIT Press.
172. Levi, I. (1988). Iteration of conditionals and the Ramsey test. Synthese, 76, 49–81.
173. Li, J. (1998). A note on partial meet package contraction. Journal of Logic, Language and
Information, 7, 139–142.
174. Lin, J. (1996). Integration of weighted knowledge bases. Artif icial Intelligence, 83(2), 363–
378.
175. Lindström, S. (1991). A semantic approach to nonmonotonic reasoning: Inference operations
and choice. Uppsala Prints and Preprints in Philosophy 6, Dep. of Philosophy, Uppsala
University.
176. Lindström, S., & Rabinowicz, W. (1989). On probabilistic representation of non-probabilistic
belief revision. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 19, 69–101.
177. Lindström, S., & Rabinowicz, W. (1991). Epistemic entrenchment with incomparabilities and
relational belief revision. In A. Fuhrmann, & M. Morreau (Eds.), The logic of theory change
(pp. 93–126). Berlin.
178. Lindström, S., & Rabinowicz, W. (1992). Belief revision, epistemic conditionals and the
Ramsey test. Synthese, 91, 195–237.
179. Lindström, S., & Rabinowicz, W. (1998). Conditionals and the Ramsey test. In D. Gabbay, &
P. Smets (Eds.), Handbook of defeasible reasoning and uncertainty mangement systems (Belief
Change) (Vol. 3, pp. 147–188). Kluwer.
180. Lindström, S., & Rabinowicz, W. (1999). Belief change for introspective agents. In S. H.
Bengt Hansson, & Nils-Eric-Sahlin (Eds.), Spinning ideas. Electronic essays dedicated to Peter
Gärdenfors on his f iftieth birthday. http://www.lucs.lu.se/spinning/.
181. Lindström, S., & Rabinowicz, W. (1999). DDL unlimited. Dynamic doxastic logic for intro-
spective agents. Erkenntnis, 51, 353–385.
182. Liu, W. (2002). A framework for multi-agent belief revision. Ph.D. thesis, University of
Newcastle.
183. Makinson, D. (1965). The paradox of the preface. Analysis, 25, 205–207.
184. Makinson, D. (1985). How to give it up: A survey of some recent work on formal aspects of
the logic of theory change. Synthese, 62, 347–363.
185. Makinson, D. (1987). On the status of the postulate of recovery in the logic of theory change.
Journal of Philosophical Logic, 16, 383–394.
186. Makinson, D. (1990). The Gärdenfors impossibility theorem in nonmonotonic contexts. Stu-
dia Logica, 49, 1–6.
187. Makinson, D. (1997). On the force of some apparent counterexamples to recovery. In
E. Garzón Valdés et al. (Eds.), Normative systems in legal and moral theory: Festschrift for
Carlos Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin (pp. 475–481). Berlin.
188. Makinson, D. (1997). Screened revision. Theoria, 63, 14–23.
189. Makinson, D. (2003). Ways of doing logic: What was new about AGM 1985. Journal of Logic
and Computation, 13, 5–15.
328 E Fermé, S.O. Hansson
190. Makinson, D. (2009). Propositional relevance through letter-sharing. Journal of Applied
Logic, 7(4), 377–387.
191. Makinson, D. (2010). Conditional probability in the light of qualitative belief change (this
issue).
192. Makinson, D., & Gärdenfors, P. (1991). Relation between the logic of theory change and
nonmonotonic logic. In Fuhrmann, & Morreau (Eds.), The logic of theory change (pp. 185–
205). Berlin.
193. Malheiro, B., Jennings, N. R., & Oliveira, E. (1994). Belief revision in multi-agent systems.
In ECAI (pp. 294–298).
194. Malheiro, B., & Oliveira, E. (2000). Solving conflicting beliefs with a distributed belief
revision approach. In Monard, M., & Sichman, J. (Eds.), Advances in artif icial intelligence.
Lecture notes in computer science (Vol. 1952, pp. 146–155). Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer.
195. Martins, J. & Shapiro, S. (1988). A model for belief revision. Artif icial Intelligence, 35,
25–79.
196. Meyer, T., Lee, K., & Booth, R. (2005). Knowledge integration for description logics. In
Proceedings of the 7th international symposium on logical formalizations of commonsense
reasoning (pp. 645–650).
197. Moore, G. (1942). A reply to my critics. In P. Schilpp (Ed.), The philosophy of G.E. Moore.
The library of living philosophers (Vol. 4, pp. 535–677). Evanston IL: Northwestern Univer-
sity.
198. Nayak, A. (1994). Iterated belief change based on epistemic entrenchment. Erkenntnis, 41,
353–390.
199. Nayak, A., Nelson, P., & Polansky, H. (1996). Belief change as change in epistemic entrench-
ment. Synthese, 109, 143–174.
200. Nayak, A., Pagnucco, M., Peppas, P. (2003). Dynamic belief revision operators. Artif icial
Intelligence, 146(2), 193–228.
201. Nebel, B. (1989). A knowledge level analysis of belief revision. In Proceedings of the 1st
international conference of principles of knowledge representation and reasoning (pp. 301–
311).
202. Nebel, B. (1992). Syntax-based approaches of belief revision. In P. Gärdenfors (Ed.) Belief
revision (pp. 52–88).
203. Nebel, B. (1998). How hard is it to revise a belief base?. In D. Dubois, & Prade, H.
(Eds.), Handbook of defeasible reasoning and uncertainty management systems. Belief change
(Vol. 3), pp. 77–145. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
204. Nittka, A. (2008). A method for reasoning about other agents’ beliefs from observations. Ph.D.
thesis, University of Leipzig.
205. Olsson, E. (1997). Coherence. Ph.D. thesis, Department of Philosophy. Uppsala University.
206. Olsson, E. (2003). Belief revision, rational choice and the unity of reason. Studia Logica, 73,
219–240.
207. Paglieri, F. (2005). See what you want, believe what you like: Relevance and likeability in
belief dynamics. In Proceedings AISB’05 symposium? Agents that want and like: Motivational
and emotional roots of cognition and action (pp. 90–97).
208. Paglieri, F. (2006). Belief dynamics: From formal models to cognitive architectures, and back
again. Ph.D. thesis, Università degli Studi di Siena.
209. Paglieri, F., & Castelfranchi, C. (2004). Argumentation and data-oriented belief revision: On
the two-sided nature of epistemic change. In CMNA IV: 4th workshop on computational
models of natural argument (pp. 5–12).
210. Paglieri, F., & Castelfranchi, C. (2006). The Toulmin test: Framing argumentation within
belief revision theories. In B. V. D. Hitchcock (Ed.), Arguing on the Toulmin model (pp.
359–377). Berlin: Springer.
211. Pagnucco, M. (1996). The role of abductive reasoning within the process of belief revision.
Ph.D. thesis, Department of Computer Science, University of Sydney.
212. Parikh, R. (1999). Beliefs, belief revision, and splitting languages. In Logic, language, and
computation. CSLI lecture notes (Vol. 96-2, pp. 266–268). Springer.
213. Peppas, P. (2004). The limit assumption and multiple revision. Journal of Logic and Compu-
tation, 14(3), 355–371.
AGM 25 Years 329
214. Plaza, J. (1989). Logics of public communications. In M. Emrich, M. Pfeifer, M. Hadzikadic, &
Z. Ras (Eds.), Proceedings of the 4th international symposium on methodologies for intelligent
systems: Poster session program (pp. 201–216).
215. Priest, G. (2001). Paraconsistent belief revision. Theoria, 67(3), 214–228.
216. Rabinowicz, W. (1995). Global belief revision based on similarities between worlds. In S. O.
Hansson, & W. Rabinowicz (Eds.), Logic for a change (Vol. 9, pp. 80–105). Uppsala Prints
and Preprints in Philosophy. Dep. of Philosophy, Uppsala University.
217. Reis, M. D. L., & Fermé, E. (2010). Possible worlds semantics for partial meet multiple
contraction. Journal of Philosophical Logic (to appear).
218. Reiter, R. (1987). A theory of diagnosis from first principles. Artif icial Intelligence, 32,
57–95.
219. Revesz, P. Z. (1993). On the semantics of theory change: Arbitration between old and new
information. In Proceedings of the 12th ACM SIGACT-SIGMOD-SIGART symposium on
principles of databases (pp. 71–92).
220. Ribeiro, M. M., & Wassermann, R. (2009). Base revision for ontology debugging. Journal of
Logic and Computation, 19(5), 721–743.
221. Rodrigues, O., & Benevides, M. (1994). Belief revision in pseudo-definite sets. In Proceedings
of the 11th Brazilian symposium on artif icial intelligence (SBIA ’94).
222. Rott, H. (1986). Ifs, though and because. Erkenntnis, 25, 345–37.
223. Rott, H. (1989). Conditionals and theory change: Revision, expansions, and additions. Syn-
these, 81, 91–113.
224. Rott, H. (1991). A nonmonotonic conditional logic for belief revision. Part 1: Semantics and
logic of simple conditionals. In F. A., & M. Morreau (Eds.), The logic of theory change,
workshop, lecture notes in artif icial intelligence (Vol. 465). Konstanz, FRG.
225. Rott, H. (1992). On the logic of theory change: More maps between different kinds of
contraction functions. In P. Gärdenfors (Ed.), Belief revision. Cambridge tracts in theoretical
computer science (Vol. 29, pp. 122–141). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
226. Rott, H. (1992). Preferential belief change using generalized epistemic entrenchment. Journal
of Logic, Language and Information, 1, 45–78.
227. Rott, H. (1993). Belief contraction in the context of the general theory of rational choice.
Journal of Symbolic Logic, 58, 1426–1450.
228. Rott, H. (1995). Just because. Taking belief bases very seriously.. In S. O. Hansson, & W.
Rabinowicz (Eds.), Logic for a change (Vol. 9, pp. 106–124). Uppsala Prints and Preprints in
Philosophy. Dep. of Philosophy, Uppsala University.
229. Rott, H. (2000). Just because. Taking belief bases seriously.. In S. Buss, P. Hajek, & P. Pudlak
(Eds.), Logic colloquium ’98—proceedings of the annual European summer meeting of the
association for symbolic logic. Lecture notes in logic (Vol. 13). Prague.
230. Rott, H. (2000). Two dogmas of belief revision. Journal of Philosophy, 97(9), 503–522.
231. Rott, H. (2001). Change, choice and inference: A study of belief revision and nonmonotonic
reasoning. Oxford logic guides. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
232. Rott, H. (2003). Basic entrenchment. Studia Logica, 73, 257–280.
233. Rott, H. (2003). Coherence and conservatism in the dynamics of belief. Part II: Iterated belief
change without dispositional coherence. Journal of Logic and Computation, 13, 111–145.
234. Rott, H. (2009). Degrees all the way down: Beliefs, non-beliefs and disbeliefs. In Springer
(Ed.), Degrees of belief (pp. 301–339). Dordrecht: Franz Huber and Christoph Schmidt-Petri.
235. Rott, H. (2009). Shifting priorities: Simple representations for twenty-seven iterated theory
change operators. In H. W. D. Makinson, & J. Malinowski (Eds.), Towards mathematical
philosophy. Trends in logic (Vol. 28, pp. 269–296). Springer Science.
236. Rott, H. (2010). Bounded revision: Two dimensional belief change between conservative and
moderate revision (manuscript).
237. Rott, H., & Pagnucco, M. (1999). Severe withdrawal (and recovery). Journal of Philosophical
Logic, 28, 501–547.
238. Ryan, M., & Schobbens, P.-Y. (1997). Counterfactuals and updates as inverse modalities.
Journal of Logic, Language and Information, 6, 123–146.
239. Samet, D. (1996). Hypothetical knowledge and games with perfect information. Games and
Economic Behavior, 17, 230–251.
330 E Fermé, S.O. Hansson
240. Satoh, K. (1988). Nonmonotonic reasoning by minimal belief revision. In FGCS (pp. 455–
462).
241. Schlechta, K. (1997). Non-prioritized belief revision based on distances between models.
Theoria, 63, 34–53.
242. Segerberg, K. (1989). A note on the impossibility theorem of Gärdenfors. Noûs, 23,
351–354.
243. Segerberg, K. (1995). Belief revision from the point of view of doxastic logic. Bulletin of the
IGPL, 3, 535–553.
244. Segerberg, K. (1995). Some questions about hypertheories. In S. O. Hansson, & W.
Rabinowicz (Eds.), Logic for a change. Uppsala prints and preprints in philosophy (Vol. 9,
pp. 136–153). Dep. of Philosophy, Uppsala University.
245. Segerberg, K. (1996). Two traditions in the logic of belief: Bringing them together. Uppsala
Prints and Preprints in Philosophy 11, Dep. of Philosophy, Uppsala University.
246. Segerberg, K. (1997). Irrevocable belief revision in dynamic doxastic logic. Uppsala Prints and
Preprints in Philosophy 6, Dep. of Philosophy, Uppsala University.
247. Sen, A. (1971). Choice functions and revealed preference. Review of Economic Studies, 38,
307–317.
248. Sen, A. (1997). Maximization and the act of choice. Econometrica, 65(4), 121–127.
249. Spohn, W. (1983). Eine theorie der kausalität. Unpublished Habilitationsschrift. Available at
http://www.uni-konstanz.de/FuF/Philo/Philosophie/Spohn/spohn_f\/iles/Habilitation.pdf.
250. Spohn, W. (1988). Ordinal conditional functions: A dynamic theory of epistemic states. In
W. Harper, & B. Skyrms (Eds.), Causation in decision, belief change and statistics (Vol. 2, pp.
105–134) Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
251. Spohn, W. (2009). A survey of ranking theory. In C. S.-P. F. Huber (Ed.), Degrees of belief.
An anthology (pp. 185–228). Dordrecht: Springer.
252. Spohn, W. (2010). Multiple contraction revisited. In M. R. Mauricio Suárez, & M. Dorato
(Eds.), EPSA epistemology and methodology of science. Launch of the European philosophy
of science association (Vol. 1, pp. 279–288). Dordrecht: Springer.
253. Stalnaker, R. (1968). A theory of conditionals. In N. Rescher (Ed.), Studies in logical theory.
American philosophical quarterly monograph series (Vol. 2). Blackwell, Oxford. Also appears
in Ifs, (ed., by W. Harper, R. C. Stalnaker and G. Pearce), Reidel, Dordrecht, 1981.
254. Tamminga, A. (2001). Belief dynamics: (Epistemo)logical investigations. Ph.D. thesis, Insti-
tute for Logic, Language and Computation, Universiteit van Amsterdam.
255. Val, A. D. (1997). Non monotonic reasoning and belief revision: Syntactic, semantic, founda-
tional, and coherence approaches. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 7, 213–240.
256. van Benthem, J. (1989). Semantic parallels in natural language and computation. In Logic
colloquium ’87. Amsterdam.
257. van Benthem, J. (1994). Logic and the flow of information. In Proceedings of the 9th inter-
national congress of logic, methodology and philosophy of science (1991). Also available as:
Report LP-91-10, ILLC, University of Amsterdam.
258. van Benthem, J. (2004). Dynamic logic for belief revision. Journal of Applied Non-Classical
Logics, 14, 1–26.
259. van Ditmarsch, H. (2005). Prolegomena to dynamic logic for belief revision. Synthese (Knowl-
edge, Rationality & Action), 147, 229–275.
260. van Ditmarsch, H., & Kooi, B. (2006). The secret of my success. Synthese, 151, 201–232.
261. van Ditmarsch, H., & Labuschagne, W. (2007). My beliefs about your beliefs—a case study
in theory of mind and epistemic logic. Knowledge, Rationality & Action (Synthese), 155, 191–
209.
262. van Ditmarsch, H., van der Hoek, W., & Kooi, B. (2007). Dynamic epistemic logic. Synthese
library (Vol. 337). Springer.
263. Wassermann, R. (1999). Resource bounded belief revision. Erkenntnis, 50, 429–446.
264. Wassermann, R. (2000). Resource bounded belief revision. Ph.D. thesis, University of
Amsterdam.
265. Wassermann, R. (2001). Local diagnosis. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 11, 107–
129.
266. Weydert, E. (1992). Relevance and revision—about generalizing syntax-based belief revision.
In D. Pearce, & G. Wagner (Eds.), Logics in AI, European workshop, JELIA ’92. Lecture
notes in computer science (Vol. 633, pp. 126–138). Germany.
AGM 25 Years 331
267. Weydert, E. (1994). General belief measures. In R. L. de Mántaras, & D. Poole (Eds.), UAI
’94: Proceedings of the tenth annual conference on uncertainty in artif icial intelligence (pp.
575–582).
268. Weydert, E. (2005). Projective default epistemology. In G. Kern-Isberner, W. Rödder, &
F. Kulmann (Eds.), Conditionals, information, and inference, international workshop, WCII
2002, Hagen, Germany, 13–15 May 2002, revised selected papers. Lecture notes in computer
science (Vol. 3301, pp. 65–85).
269. Williams, M.-A. (1992). Two operators for theory bases. In Proc. Australian joint artif icial
intelligence conference (pp. 259–265).
270. Williams, M.-A. (1997). Applications of belief revision. In Proceedings of the fourteenth
international joint conference on artif icial intelligence (pp. 74–79).
271. Williams, M.-A., & Sims, A. (2000). SATEN: An object-oriented web-based revision and ex-
traction engine. In International workshop on nonmonotonic reasoning (NMR’2000). Online
computer science abstract. http://arxiv.org/abs/cs.AI/0003059/.
272. Winslett, M. (1988). Reasoning about action using a possible models approach. In AAAI (pp.
89–93).
273. Zhang, D. (1996). Belief revision by sets of sentences. Journal of Computer Science and
Technology, 11(2), 108–125.
274. Zhang, D. (2004). Properties of iterated multiple belief revision. In V. Lifschitz, & I. Niemelä
(Eds.), LPNMR 2004 (pp. 314–325).
275. Zhang, D. (2010). A logic-based axiomatic model of bargaining. Artif icial Intelligence, 174,
1307–1322.
276. Zhuang, Z., & Pagnucco, M. (2010). Horn contraction via epistemic entrenchment. In T.
Janhunen, & I. Niemelä (Eds.), Logics in artif icial intelligence Lecture notes in computer
science (Vol. 6341, pp. 339–351). Springer Berlin / Heidelberg
